A large literature explores the role of global norms in defining appropriate action for nationstates (Meyer et al. 1997) . Most studies focus on changes to national policies in response to the transnational normative pressures of world society. This study extends world society theory by examining the diffusion of global norms to nonelite individuals. Normative global scripts, such as human rights, are not solely available to national governments. To the contrary, global norms also provide moralized guidelines for individual behavior (Meyer and Jepperson 2000) . To capture the extent of world society's influence, it is important to go beyond studies of policy change.
Recent transnational advocacy and development programming on issues of violence against women provide an interesting and important case for examining the influence of world society on individual attitudes. This study examines trends in attitudes about intimate partner violence; this form of violence against women is commonly defined as "any behavior within an intimate relationship that causes physical, psychological, or sexual harm to those in the relationship" (Heise and Garcia-Moreno 2002:89) . It often occurs in private as part of personal relationships and, as such, may be particularly resistant to external pressures, which makes it a good case for examination of global influences. Also, norms Pierotti 241 about interpersonal relationships (as opposed to norms about institutional arrangements such as the structure of education systems) are relevant to all individuals, irrespective of social position. Finally, rapid dissemination of global norms about violence against women began in the mid-1990s and accelerated in the first decade of the 2000s. This timeframe means one can use recent survey data to examine whether attitudes became more consistent with world society's cultural scripts as those scripts were disseminated.
If dissemination of global norms is affecting individuals worldwide, the proportion of people who view intimate partner violence as legitimate should be declining. I test this hypothesis using nationally representative data on women's attitudes in 26 countries, all the countries for which relevant data were available at two time points. I then combine demographic theories and methods with world society theories about the dissemination of cultural scripts to derive and test explanations for aggregate-level trends in attitudes about intimate partner violence.
I find that within the first decade of the 2000s, women in 23 of 26 countries became more likely to reject intimate partner violence as a justifiable form of social control. Moreover, this aggregate trend was due to a rapid increase in the likelihood of rejecting intimate partner violence among women of all ages, women with various levels of education and access to media, and women in urban and rural areas. This suggests the change was mostly due to the wide dissemination of global cultural scripts. Structural socioeconomic and demographic shifts in the population account for little of the observed trend.
ConCEPtuAl FRAmEwoRK
World society theory holds that the global arena is more than political and economic exchanges among states (Meyer et al. 1997) . World society is a distinct social space constituted by interactions among transnational actors, especially intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations, and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including advocacy groups, professional associations, and charities with global reach Merry 2006) . World society actors are influential because of their ability to define and promote new cultural scripts and models of policy and activism (Keck and Sikkink 1998) . Global cultural scripts draw on fundamental principles of world society to define appropriate behavior for individuals, organizations, and nation-states Meyer and Jepperson 2000) .
Scholars have documented evidence of the influence of global models on a variety of national policy domains: human rights (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Koo and Ramirez 2009 ), democracy (Torfason and Ingram 2010) , environmental protection (Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000) , education (Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992) , population (Barrett and Tsui 1999 ), women's labor force participation (Berkovitch 1999a ), women's voting rights (Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997 ), women's political participation (Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006) , gender mainstreaming (True and Mintrom 2001) , female circumcision (Boyle and Preves 2000) , and criminal regulation of sex (Frank, Camp, and Boutcher 2010) . In each of these domains, access to global models proves a powerful predictor of national policy action. Moreover, dissemination of global cultural scripts explains increasing worldwide isomorphism in these policy domains.
The analysis presented here pushes beyond existing studies of policy change by testing whether individual-level attitudinal change is also consistent with the influence of global cultural scripts. Case studies from around the world demonstrate the complexities of when and how global norms are adopted, resisted, modified, and rejected by local actors working within their own cultural logics (Boyle 2002; Levitt and Merry 2009; Rubtsova 2011) . These studies add great depth to our knowledge of the social processes that accompany the introduction of new cultural scripts. What the case study approach cannot detect, however, are broad trends that correspond with the articulation and diffusion of global American Sociological Review 78(2) cultural scripts (Frank, Hardinge, and WosickCorrea 2009) . That is the goal of this research. If world society norms exert power at the individual level as they do at the national policy level, we would expect the diffusion of global cultural scripts to produce relatively rapid changes in individual attitudes.
Demographic research, especially studies of changing family patterns, has long considered global ideational influences on individuallevel attitudinal and behavior change (Cleland and Wilson 1987; Jayakody, Thornton, and Axinn 2008; Lesthaeghe 1983; Mason 1997; National Research Council 2001; Thornton 2001 Thornton , 2005 Yount and Rashad 2008) . The demographic literature describes mechanisms for the diffusion of global family models, including urbanization, education, and mass media, along with NGO outreach, government initiatives, development programs, and religious institutions (Thornton 2005) . Scholars have also documented the role of these mechanisms in disseminating messages about women's rights (Berkovitch 1999a; Merry 2006) . I bring together world society theory and demographic theory about the diffusion of cultural models to derive hypotheses about aggregate-level trends in attitudes about intimate partner violence. Figure 1 depicts the theorized pathways of influence linking global cultural scripts with individual attitudes. Diffusion mechanisms connect global cultural scripts directly to individuals and operate indirectly through national political actions. The dramatic growth in the number of women's international NGOs and their efforts at cultural diffusion are largely credited with linking the global and the local (Berkovitch 1999b ). In this model, both national policy and individual attitudes are affected by the diffusion of global cultural scripts. Attitudinal changes may be bolstered by policy action, but they do not depend on national legal changes. I simplified the model to emphasize the object of this study, and this requires some clarification. First, I build on the research described earlier that examines the influence of global models. The focus on vertical diffusion is not meant to deny that both policymakers (Chimbwete, Watkins, and Zulu 2005) and individuals (Boyle and Carbone-Lopez 2006; Htun and Weldon 2012) The definition of violence against women is a cultural product; it is based on fundamental principles of world society, including universalism, liberal individualism, and equality (Berkovitch and Bradley 1999; Boli and Thomas 1997) . National and international elites are encouraged to support the new legal and institutional structures because of the association between human rights and gender equality on the one hand, and modernity and development on the other hand (Berkovitch 1999a; Luke and Watkins 2002; Thompson 2002; Thornton 2001) . Feminist movements in Western countries are an important source of legitimating ideology and funding for efforts to highlight violence against women as a transnational issue. Global inequalities affect the construction of the definition of violence against women, but the current influence of global cultural norms cannot be reduced to the unilateral imposition of Western values. Dissemination of global cultural scripts depends on the participation of activists all over the world who vernacularize the global models into language that makes sense in each local context (Merry 2006) .
The dominant definition of violence against women is enshrined in transnational agreements and national laws. In 1979, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which demanded changes not only in states' practices, but also required states to ensure private entities did not discriminate against women (Thompson 2002) . This declaration opened the door to discussions about violations of women's rights in the private sphere.
The debate about violence against women found its full expression at the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo and the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. At the Cairo conference, gender equality and women's rights were promoted on an international stage as key components of improving reproductive health. The Beijing conference built on the success of Cairo and produced a Platform for Action proclaiming that violence against women is a violation of women's human rights (Tinker 2004) .
In 2008, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon launched a campaign called UNiTE to End Violence against Women. The campaign website called violence against women a "global pandemic" and quoted the Secretary-General saying, "there is one universal truth, applicable to all countries, cultures and communities: violence against women is never acceptable, never excusable, never tolerable" (UNiTE 2012). Global prominence of the issue of violence against women has been increasing ever since the 1994 and 1995 conferences in Cairo and Beijing. Transnational activists and policymakers share well-established cultural scripts defining the problem, its scope, and its solutions.
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Evidence of the worldwide influence of global cultural scripts about violence against women is seen in patterns of national legal change. One study of rape law reform found that global forces propelled a wave of recent changes to rape laws (Frank et al. 2009 ). The changes reflected global norms that categorize rape as a violation of individual liberty, rights, and equality. Another study credited global forces with inducing national governments to criminalize female circumcision (Boyle and Preves 2000) .
I gathered information from the United Nations Secretary-General's online database on violence against women to examine whether there is also a global pattern in the enactment of national policies addressing intimate partner violence.
1 The findings, presented in Figure 2, 
GlobAl noRmS AnD InDIVIDuAl AttItuDES
The analysis has three parts. I begin by investigating patterns in attitudinal trends. Second, I test mechanisms of diffusion of global cultural scripts as predictors of individual attitudes in cross-sectional analyses. Finally, I examine several potential explanations for the aggregate trends. In this section, I present hypotheses for each part of the analysis.
Aggregate Trends
First, I examine whether individual attitudes are becoming more consistent with cultural scripts of world society. Despite international elites' and national policymakers' heightened attention to violence against women, it is conceivable that global cultural scripts never reach nonelite women who are not engaged in transnational activism. Existing literature leads to skepticism regarding individual access to global cultural scripts. World society scholars have documented decoupling between national policies based on global cultural models and implementation of those policies (Meyer et al. 1997) . Furthermore, in legally pluralistic societies, such as many of the countries in this study, the formal legal system or transnational principles of human rights may not be salient cultural frameworks in people's everyday lives.
In world society, the consensus is that a husband's physical abuse of his wife is part of a broader social system that reinforces gender inequality. For individual survey respondents, however, the meaning of violent acts may be affected by more immediate concerns, such as the interactional context and individual behaviors (Heise 1998) . If individuals are unaware of the global discourse about violence against women or find it irrelevant to their lives, there is no reason to anticipate consistent trends in attitudes about intimate partner violence.
On the other hand, global norms may have symbolic power, independent of national governments' translation of those norms. National and international discourse may be a cultural resource, enabling individuals to change how they perceive and evaluate violent acts. As Levitt and Merry (2009:447) note, "that women's rights are codified into law endows them with authority and connects them to the state, even though few women turn to formal legal arenas to redress their grievances." Local elite activists gain legitimacy and access to resources by using global norms to justify their work (Tsutsui and Shin 2008) ; these activists then further disseminate global cultural scripts.
Moreover, access to global norms about violence against women is facilitated by the work of many types of actors. Education systems, media, international donor programming, NGOs, and religious organizations also disseminate global cultural scripts. NGOs and development programs distribute printed materials, sponsor public discussions, and offer training to local professionals and community groups on issues of gender equality and violence against women. For example, during 2005 to 2007, a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) women's rights program in Benin printed and distributed 15,000 booklets explaining women's rights, placed 2,000 posters about women's rights in city halls, produced films on women's rights and broadcast them to an estimated 20,000 individuals, reached nearly 7,000 people through public meetings in rural communities, and trained local paralegals, health After testing this hypothesis, additional sensitivity analyses will assess whether attitudinal trends were similar among married and unmarried women, and among men.
Mechanisms of Diffusion: Predictors of Attitudes about Intimate Partner Violence
World society theory predicts that people most closely connected to the global institutional environment will be most likely to reflect the values promoted in that environment (Meyer 2010) . Previous research in subSaharan Africa on attitudes about intimate partner violence confirms this prediction: on average, people in urban areas, those with more education, and those with greater access to media are more likely to reject intimate partner violence (Uthman, Lawoko, and Moradi 2009) . If the dissemination of global norms about violence against women is at least partly responsible for individual attitudes, we should find a cross-sectional association between access to messages emanating from the world cultural environment and attitudes about intimate partner violence. I test the influence of three mechanisms of global norm diffusion: urban residence, education, and access to media. Urban centers are often sites of social change (Ryder 1965) . Residents of urban areas are more likely to be familiar with global norms because of their relative proximity to the elite organizations and individuals who disseminate those ideas. Also, people in urban areas live in socially heterogeneous environments and are exposed to a wide variety of life styles in terms of social class, cultural and religious orientations, and political ideologies. Access to education and media has similar effects of expanding horizons and increasing exposure to global scripts (Hornik and McAnany 2001) . In many countries, messages about women's rights, gender equality, and problems of violence against women are explicitly discussed in school curricula and in media programming.
Hypothesis 2: Individuals with greater access to global discourse through urban residence, education, or access to media are more likely to reject intimate partner violence than those with more limited access to the global discourse.
Explanations for the Aggregate Trend
From theories of diffusion, demographers have proposed two explanations for aggregatelevel trends in attitudes: attitudinal shifts within existing population groups and changes in population composition (Firebaugh 1992) . Changes within population groups are consistent with widespread diffusion of cultural models and rapid aggregate-level change. Population compositional changes occur as some subgroups grow in relative size and become a larger proportion of the population. Attitudinal trends due to population compositional shifts are the result of more narrow cultural diffusion and should produce more gradual change. Analyses of the demographic processes driving attitudinal change thus provide further tests about whether these trends are consistent with the widespread influence of global cultural scripts. I take two approaches to understanding attitudinal trends. First, I investigate the extent to which changes in population composition-in terms of urban living, education, and media access-explain the change in attitudes about intimate partner violence. Second, I examine how much of the observed trend is due to attitudinal changes within birth cohorts measured in both survey waves versus change due to replacement in the survey population of older cohorts by younger cohorts who are more likely to reject intimate partner violence.
Increasing urban living, education, and media access. Assuming that tests of Hypothesis 2 show that people in urban areas with more education and media access are more likely to reject intimate partner violence, the next question is to what extent changes in population composition account for the aggregate-level trend in attitudes about intimate partner violence. Most of these countries' populations are becoming more urban and have increasing access to education and media. Some of the observed changes in attitudes, therefore, may result from changing population composition.
Although I expect changes in urban living, education, and media access to explain some of the attitudinal change, I anticipate that the broad dissemination of global cultural scripts produced a shift in attitudes that is greater and more rapid than what is explained by population compositional changes. Urban living, education, and media access increase exposure to global norms, but these are not the only ways of gaining access to global cultural scripts. Messages are also disseminated through personal networks and diffused through many other mechanisms by agents of world society. These efforts to diffuse global norms have the potential to lead to attitudinal change within population groups defined by place of residence, education, and media access-change that is above and beyond shifts due to differences in population composition. Tests of this hypothesis will evaluate whether patterns of attitudinal change are consistent with relatively broad dissemination of global cultural scripts. Within-cohort change and cohort replacement. Social scientists often look to cohort replacement as an explanation for social change (Alwin 1990 ; Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988; Ryder 1965) . Cohort replacement suggests that social change occurs as younger generations with distinct beliefs and values replace older generations in the population. A main assumption of cohort replacement theory is that individuals' attitudes are formed early in life and remain relatively stable over their life course.
An alternative model of social change assumes that individuals change their attitudes as adults (Alwin 1990) . That adults may change their opinions is the operating assumption of activists and development practitioners who expend resources attempting to change how individuals think about violence against women. This is within-cohort change and it may result from aging-as respondents get older their opinions change-or from period effects-if there is something different about later periods that causes people to change their opinions.
Transnational dissemination of global cultural scripts about violence against women influences both the context in which new generations are socialized and the cultural context in which already socialized adults make meaning of their actions and interactions. I hypothesize that both types of change will be operative, but within-cohort change will explain more of the observed trend. If the cause of the aggregate-level trends were limited to cohort replacement, it would mean either that only young people have exposure to global cultural scripts on violence against women (perhaps through school), or that only young people are receptive to those messages.
Given the variety of mechanisms of diffusion of global cultural scripts, I expect people of all ages to have access to those scripts. And, while it is conceivable that older women are somewhat more resistant to external cultural influences, global cultural scripts should be powerful enough to influence people during all periods of the life course. 
DAtA
Data for this study come from 52 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) datasets, including two from each of 26 countries. 3 All countries with two waves of DHS data on women's attitudes about intimate partner violence are included in the analysis. These countries are Armenia, Benin, Bolivia, Cambodia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Nepal, Nigeria, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Half of the countries with data meeting the inclusion criteria are in subSaharan Africa. As such, inclusion or exclusion of variables and models from the analyses is largely driven by their relevance in the African context. Nonetheless, although not representative of the globe, these data come from a wide range of low-and middle-income countries.
The datasets come from nationally representative, repeated cross-sectional surveys. In each country, the first wave of data collection was in the early-to mid-2000s and the second was in the mid-to late-2000s. For most countries, the two waves of data collection were five years apart. The shortest interval between waves was three years in Egypt and the longest was seven years in India. Table 1 shows survey years and sample sizes for each of the 26 countries. The timing of these data collections corresponds with the period of increasing global attention to issues of violence against women. 4 Sampling for each DHS study was conducted by randomly selecting primary sampling units (PSUs) and then randomly sampling households within selected PSUs. In most countries, all women between the ages of 15 and 49 years were eligible to participate. In Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Nepal, and Turkey, only ever-married women were eligible.
5 This inconsistency in sampling is one reason results are comparable within country and across time but not across countries. All analyses use sampling weights to adjust for variation in the probability of selection.
Dependent Measure
The outcome variable derives from a question that asked respondents whether it is okay for a man to hit or beat his wife under certain circumstances. Specifically, the most common form of the question asked, "Sometimes a husband is annoyed or angered by things which his wife does. In your opinion, is a husband justified in hitting or beating his wife in the following situations?" The five scenarios presented to respondents were (1) if she goes out without telling him, (2) if she neglects the children, (3) if she argues with him, (4) if she refuses to have sex with him, and (5) if she burns the food. Given the sensitive nature of this survey question, differences in question wording have the potential to influence the distribution of responses. Based on research by Yount and colleagues (2011) , I conducted an analysis of question wording and determined that small differences across surveys in eight countries could not account for the observed trends. Moreover, the findings presented below do not depend on inclusion of the countries with question wording differences.
There is some variation between countries, however, in the scenarios presented as potential justification for intimate partner violence. To ensure comparability within country and across time, only scenarios that were asked in both waves of data collection were included in the dependent variable. The dependent variable should not be compared across countries, however, because the scenarios are not the same in each country. The standard scenarios (listed earlier) were used in the dependent variable for 20 of the countries. Examining trends in responses to each scenario individually provides interesting information about shifting criteria for the establishment of just cause for violence (Heise 1998) . In this analysis, however, I am interested in the degree to which attitudes conform to global norms about violence against women, which emphasize rejection of all justifications for violence. For that reason, I created a dichotomous dependent variable that indicates whether the respondent broadly rejects wife beating. This variable is coded 1 for respondents who rejected all scenarios suggested by the survey interviewer as reasonable justification for a husband to beat his wife and 0 otherwise. 8 For the sake of brevity, I will interpret this throughout the analysis as a rejection of intimate partner violence. Note that this is an over-simplification; some respondents may reject all of the suggested justifications but may believe there are other instances in which a husband is justified in beating his wife. Across the 52 datasets, an average of 51 percent of respondents rejected all scenarios. To ensure results are not an artifact of the dependent variable coding, I also conducted analyses using an additive scale (0 Respondents who came in contact with newspapers, radio, or television at least once per week were given a code of 1 for access to media. Respondents with less frequent access were coded 0. In addition to the main predictors, I tested several other variables for a relationship with attitudes about intimate partner violence. First, I included continuous measures of age and age-squared in each model as controls. The analysis of cohort replacement closely examines the effect of age on attitudes about intimate partner violence. I also investigated the role of wealth. Wealth may increase access to national and international elites who participate in global culture and provide means for social engagement outside the home. Wealth may therefore serve as an additional mechanism of diffusion of global culture.
Given the populations under study, it is difficult to measure wealth, and available measures indicate a large amount of clumping on the poor end of the wealth scale, especially in Africa (Vyas and Kumaranayake 2006) . The DHS does not include income or expenditure data; instead, the surveys collect information on household characteristics and household assets. Following Filmer and Pritchett (2001) , I used principal components analysis (PCA) to construct wealth indices for each survey sample. Given the available measures, however, the resulting index was highly correlated with urban living. Among the African countries, the correlation between the wealth score and urban residence ranged from a low of .55 in Benin to a high of .86 in Ethiopia. Because the wealth index is not a great measure, and because it is highly correlated with urban living, I ultimately dropped it from the multivariate analyses.
Religious leaders and organizations are a common source of cultural scripts, so I included a dichotomous variable to indicate whether a respondent identified as Muslim. Empirical evidence suggests there are substantial cultural differences between Muslim and non-Muslim societies on issues of gender equality (Norris and Inglehart 2002) . I included this as a control rather than a variable of primary interest, however, because religious context varies substantially across the countries in this analysis and because it is beyond the scope of this article to examine the complex relationship between religion and cultural scripts about gender.
A final set of control variables measure women's status within marriage, which may also be associated with attitudes about intimate partner violence. Women who have never married may be more independent and less tolerant of intimate partner violence than their married peers. In countries with data from all women, I coded women who have ever been married as 1 and those who have never married as 0.
Women who are relatively dependent on their marital relationship for their livelihoods may be more tolerant of abuse than women with more power in their relationship. Previous research in low-income countries has found that women who marry at young ages and women who have fewer years of schooling than their husbands are more likely to justify intimate partner violence (Kishor and Subaiya 2008; Yount 2005; Yount and Li 2009) . Women who marry young generally complete fewer years of school, have less say in choosing their spouse, and have less time to form a sense of self outside of their marital relationship. Women with lower levels of education than their husbands may have relatively lower bargaining power within their relationship, making them more dependent and more likely to justify intimate partner violence.
9
I treated women's age at marriage as a categorical variable, dividing ever-married women into those who were first married at age 15 years or younger, those married between age 16 and age 19, and those married at age 20 or older. I tested several specifications for capturing educational gaps between wives and husbands. A variable with three categories-husband and wife have the same level of education, husband attended a higher level of education, wife attended a higher level of education-captured the most meaningful variation among respondents. A separate variable for husbands' education was coded the same way as the respondent's educational attainment variable.
The weighted distribution of each of the independent variables by country and wave, as well as results of adjusted Wald tests for significant change between survey waves, are available in Tables S1a and S1b of the online supplement (http://asr.sagepub.com/supplemental).
Unfortunately, direct measures of individual access to global cultural scripts, or the influence of those scripts, are not available in large national samples from many countries. Therefore, I cannot test the direct influence of world society on individual attitudes. As detailed in the previous section, however, I have the data to investigate whether world society theory may be applied to explain the observed trends in attitudes about intimate partner violence. The next section describes how I test each of the hypotheses described earlier.
AnAlytIC PlAn
Hypothesis 1. The first part of the analysis describes the trends in attitudes about intimate partner violence. To examine Hypothesis 1, I used adjusted Wald tests to analyze whether there was a statistically significant change between the first and second waves in the proportion of respondents in each country who reject intimate partner violence.
Hypothesis 2. To test Hypothesis 2, I examined predictors of rejection of intimate partner violence. I used chi-square tests to examine the bivariate relationship between each predictor variable and rejection of intimate partner violence (results available from author). I then tested the multivariate relationship between the predictor variables and rejection of intimate partner violence using logistic regression.
Hypothesis 3. The next part of the analysis examines the extent to which aggregatelevel trends in attitudes about intimate partner violence are explained by shifts in population composition. I used direct standardization to examine how much of the change over time was due to increases in urban living, educational attainment, and media access. Direct standardization allows for estimation of a counterfactual scenario. What percent of the population in wave 2 would have rejected intimate partner violence if attitudes about intimate partner violence had remained unchanged but the population composition had shifted? For each survey wave in each country, I divided the population into subgroups by urban/rural residence, highest level of education attended, and media access/no access. This resulted in a distribution of respondents across 16 subgroups. For each subgroup, I estimated the percent who rejected intimate partner violence (rate of rejection). Standardization showed whether the percent who reject intimate partner violence in the population would have changed if the rate of rejection for each subgroup had remained the same. So, for each country, I multiplied the subgroup distribution from wave 2 by the rates of rejection from wave 1.
Hypothesis 4. The final part of the analysis tests how much of the change in population averages on the dependent variable can be explained by within-cohort change and how by guest on July 15, 2013 asr.sagepub.com Downloaded from much can be explained by cohort replacement. To do this, I used linear regression decomposition (Firebaugh 1989) . This model estimates change due to cohort replacement net of within-cohort change (the combined effects of age and period) and vice versa. This method assumes that the two components are orthogonal and that the effects are linear. I examined the reasonableness of these assumptions by testing how closely the predicted change from the two components sum to the actual observed change.
RESultS
Aggregate Trends
The data show striking changes in the proportion of women in each country who reject intimate partner violence. The changes are impressive because of the nearly uniform direction of the trend and their magnitude within a span of only five years. Figure 3 shows the proportion of women who reject all justifications for intimate partner violence in each survey wave for each country: the top bar is the percent in wave 1 and the middle bar is the percent in wave 2. (The standardized wave 2 bar will be discussed below.) The change is statistically significant at α = .05 in all countries. In 23 out of 26 countries, there is a significant increase in the proportion of women rejecting intimate partner violence. Twelve of the countries saw more than a 10 percentage point increase in the rate of rejection. Nigeria had the largest change, with a 19-percentage point increase in the proportion of women who reject intimate partner violence, followed by Zambia, Kenya, Rwanda, and Armenia with approximately 15-percentage point increases in the rejection of intimate partner violence.
India, Bolivia, and Ethiopia had the smallest increases in rates of rejection, but the changes are all still statistically significant and in the expected direction. Indonesia, Jordan, and Madagascar are clear outliers. Those three countries had a statistically significant decrease in the proportion of women who reject intimate partner violence.
In the online supplement, Table S2 presents responses by survey year for each scenario incorporated into the outcome measure. The detailed story is largely the same as the picture in Figure 3 . Twenty countries had significant decreases in the acceptability of at least three of the scenarios as justification for intimate partner violence. In Turkey, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, the trend appears to be more tenuous. The trend is in the opposite direction for three or four of the scenarios in Indonesia, Jordan, and Madagascar.
Additional tests examined whether trends were similar among women who had married and those who had not, as well as among men. In all countries where both ever-and never-married women were surveyed, the observed trend was in the same direction and of similar magnitude regardless of marital status (results not shown). There were two waves of data available for men's attitudes about intimate partner violence for 15 of the countries included in this study. As shown in Figure S1 in the online supplement, trends among men mirror those among women. Twelve countries had significant and substantial increases in the percent of men rejecting intimate partner violence. In the Dominican Republic, there was no significant change in the percent of men rejecting intimate partner violence. In Indonesia and Madagascar, as among women, there was a significant decrease in the percent of men rejecting intimate partner violence.
Overall, I find a great deal of support for Hypothesis 1. With the exception of Indonesia, Jordan, and Madagascar, women were substantially more likely to reject intimate partner violence in the more recent wave of data collection. These substantial changes occurred over a span of only five years, and the observed change was comparable among women who have ever married and those who have not, as well as among men. The trend in attitudes about intimate partner violence is converging toward the global cultural script that prescribes the rejection of violence against women. 
Mechanisms of Diffusion: Predictors of Attitudes about Intimate Partner Violence
Next, I examine whether people with greater access to global cultural scripts are more likely to endorse the values embedded in those scripts. I tested three primary mechanisms linking individuals to global cultural scripts as predictors of women's attitudes about intimate partner violence: urban residence, education, and media access. Tables 2a and 2b present results of multivariate logistic regression as odds ratios. These models tested the significance of the three mechanisms of diffusion simultaneously, while controlling for survey wave, Muslim identity, age, age-squared, marital status, age at marriage, and husband's education. The first coefficient in the top left of the first table means that in Armenia, women in wave 2 had 1.99 greater odds of rejecting intimate partner violence than did women in wave 1, controlling for the other factors in the model.
Results presented in Tables 2a and 2b are again remarkable for their consistency. In 22 countries, women who lived in urban areas had higher odds of rejecting intimate partner violence, controlling for all other factors. The association is not significant in Mali and Zambia and it goes in the opposite direction in Madagascar and Nepal. Women who had attended at least some secondary school had much higher odds of rejecting intimate partner violence in all but four countries. The effect of higher education is even larger and is significant in each country. Even controlling for urban living and education, media access is still associated with higher odds of rejecting intimate partner violence in 14 countries. Overall, each of these mechanisms for diffusion of global norms has a substantial, independent effect on the odds of rejecting intimate partner violence. This is strong support for Hypothesis 2: women with more access to global discourse are more likely to reject intimate partner violence.
It is also worth noting effects for some of the other variables in the final models. Controlling for all other factors in the model, older women were more likely to reject intimate partner violence in 17 of the countries. In many of these countries the effect is curvilinear; the agesquared term is significant, indicating that the positive effect of age diminishes among the oldest respondents. I will discuss the effect of age further during the examination of cohort replacement versus intra-cohort change.
In 14 of the 20 countries that did not restrict the sample based on marital status, women who had never married were more likely than those who had married to reject intimate partner violence. Moreover, in 12 countries, women who married at older ages were more likely than women who married at age 15 or younger to reject intimate partner violence. This indicates that women's status in marriage is associated with attitudes about intimate partner violence, even after controlling for key demographic characteristics.
In the final model, I eliminated the categorical variable capturing spousal differences in education and replaced it with a direct measure of husband's educational attainment. Models that include variables for spousal educational differences indicate that, contrary to expectation, compared to women in couples with the same educational level, women in marriages with husbands who had more education were more likely to reject intimate partner violence, and women in marriages where they had more education than their husbands were less likely to reject intimate partner violence. Models that include husband's educational attainment reveal that the positive relationship between education and attitudes about intimate partner violence for both women and men is stronger than the effects of relative spousal education. In nearly all countries, a husband's educational attainment had a positive association with his wife's attitudes about intimate partner violence, independent of her own educational attainment.
Explanations for the Aggregate Trend
Increasing urban living, education, and media access. Because urban residence, Note: DR = Dominican Republic. Primary school education was used as the reference group for Armenia because very few respondents had no education.
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). education, and media access are strongly associated with attitudes about intimate partner violence at the individual level, it is important to examine how much of the aggregate-level trend is explained by changes in the population composition on these characteristics. A first indication of the role of population compositional changes is found in Tables 2a  and 2b . The coefficient on wave 2 remains statistically significant in every country except for India and Turkey, despite inclusion of a number of demographic predictors. This is evidence that urbanization, increasing educational attainment, expanding media access, and improvements in women's status in marriage do not explain all of the change in attitudes about intimate partner violence. I further tested the magnitude of the effect of compositional changes by estimating a counterfactual: the percent of women who would have rejected all justifications for violence in wave 2 if rates of rejection of intimate partner violence had remained the same as they were for each population group in wave 1. As described earlier, I defined population groups by urban/rural residence, level of education, and media access because these characteristics are consistently associated with attitudes about intimate partner violence. In Figure 3 , the first and second bars show the actual percent of women who rejected intimate partner violence in waves 1 and 2. The third bar for each country shows what the rejection percentage would have been in wave 2 if the population composition had changed but the rates of rejection within each population group had remained the same.
In almost all countries, the counterfactual scenario produces a rejection percentage that is remarkably close to the actual wave 1 percent who rejected intimate partner violence. The wave 2 standardized bar looks like the wave 1 bar. This means that had there not been within-group attitudinal changes, there would have been little change between waves in the percent who reject intimate partner violence. In most countries, population compositional changes account for only a small portion of the observed change between waves 1 and 2. Turkey is the exception, where population compositional changes account for two-thirds of the change in attitudes. Otherwise, population compositional changes account for one-third of the change in Ethiopia and India, one-quarter of the change in Armenia and Tanzania, and 20 percent or less of the change in all other countries. This provides support for Hypothesis 3: increasing urbanization, educational attainment, and media access explain some, but only a small portion, of the change in the percent of women who reject intimate partner violence. This finding is consistent with widespread diffusion of global cultural scripts through a variety of mechanisms.
Within-cohort change and cohort replacement. The analysis of within-cohort change versus cohort replacement examines how much of the observed change is due to changes within the birth cohorts represented in both waves of data collection versus change due to entrance into the population of new cohorts of women with different attitudes than their predecessors. As hypothesized, withincohort change has greater explanatory power than does cohort replacement: increases within birth cohorts in the percent rejecting intimate partner violence explain the population-level trends in attitudes. In a surprising finding, however, in most countries, cohort replacement has a negative effect on the percent of women who rejected intimate partner violence. Table 3 presents results of the regression decomposition. The left panel (columns 1 and 2) presents results already displayed in Figure 3 : the percent of women in each survey who reject intimate partner violence. The third column shows the percentage-point change between the two time points, or the percent in wave 2 minus the percent in wave 1. Columns 4 and 5 show results from the regression decomposition analysis described earlier. Column 4 presents the amount (in percentage-points) of predicted change due to cohort replacement, and column 5 shows the amount of predicted change due to within-cohort change.
If this linear regression model fits the data, the predicted change in columns 4 and 5 should sum to equal the observed change shown in column 3. The model fits in cases where both survey year and a respondent's birth cohort have independent linear effects on the likelihood of rejection of intimate partner violence. The percentages in column 6 indicate how closely the predicted change mirrors the actual change. Agreement is close to 100 percent in almost all countries, indicating that this is an appropriate method for decomposing within-cohort change versus cohort replacement. In India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Nepal, and Zimbabwe, the agreement is not as strong, so the decomposition results should be interpreted with caution.
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Finally, columns 7 and 8 show that withincohort change is overwhelmingly driving the dominant trend at the aggregate level. Column 7 shows the percent of the observed change attributable to cohort replacement and column 8 presents the percent attributable to within-cohort change. In outlier countries that had a decrease in rejection of intimate partner violence, cohort replacement explains a substantial portion of the aggregate trend. In Indonesia and Madagascar, nearly 40 percent of the change can be attributed to cohort replacement. Similarly, in Jordan, over 20 percent of the decrease in the percent of women who reject intimate partner violence was due to cohort replacement. As seen earlier, in all other countries, women were more likely to reject intimate partner violence in wave 2 than in wave 1. Of those countries, cohort replacement contributed the most to the attitudinal trend in Ethiopia: 21 percent of the change was due to cohort replacement.
In the other 22 countries, cohort replacement explains almost none of the change. The percent of change due to cohort replacement is negative for many of these countries: had there been only cohort replacement and no within-cohort change, the trend would go in the opposite direction. If cohort replacement was the only factor driving the change, a smaller percentage of women in wave 2 than in wave 1 would have rejected intimate partner violence. Column 8 shows that within-cohort change in these countries accounts for more than 100 percent of the observed change. Based on these results, I find support for only part of Hypothesis 4. Withincohort change is the driving factor behind the increase in the percent of women who reject intimate partner violence. Contrary to expectations, however, in most countries cohort replacement does not explain any of the observed trend.
This finding relates to the somewhat surprising relationship between age and rejection of intimate partner violence. Cohort replacement explains none of the observed trend in most countries because young women were less likely than older women to reject intimate partner violence. The logistic regression models presented in Tables 2a and 2b show that odds of rejecting intimate partner violence generally increase with age. Although this does not conform to expectations that youth are more likely to adapt to new social norms, it is consistent with the idea that age is a source of empowerment for women. Women generally gain self-confidence, respect, and freedom as they age. This may translate into increased rejection of intimate partner violence.
Within-cohort change may be due to respondent aging or a period effect that makes respondents of all ages in wave 2 more likely to reject intimate partner violence than respondents in wave 1. I posit that the period effect attributable to dissemination of global cultural scripts plays a major role. Evidence for this interpretation is provided by the fact that women of all ages were more likely to reject intimate partner violence in wave 2. In a separate analysis (not shown), I found that in most countries, a majority of cohorts showed a significant increase in the percent who rejected intimate partner violence. The trend is consistent across ages. In summary, within-cohort change is overwhelmingly driving the dominant trend at the aggregate level. Cohort replacement explains some of the negative change in Indonesia, Jordan, and Madagascar, but otherwise it is not a good explanation. 
DISCuSSIon
This study extends world society theory by testing whether it can be usefully applied to understanding trends in attitudes among nonelite individuals. Previous world society research documents the power of global cultural scripts and models to influence national policymakers. Scholars have found that the common pressures of world society explain otherwise inexplicable isomorphism in national policies (Meyer et al. 1997) . Global cultural scripts are not just relevant to national policymakers; they also provide moralized individual behavioral scripts that can influence individuals outside the halls of government. To capture the extent of world society's influence, it is therefore important to study individual attitudes and behaviors. I examined trends in individual attitudes and found substantial support for the hypothesized influence of global cultural scripts.
The study examined data on individual attitudes about intimate partner violence during a period of heighted transnational activism on this issue. Results show that after only five years, a significantly larger percentage of women in Armenia, Benin, Bolivia, Cambodia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, India, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nepal, Nigeria, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe rejected intimate partner violence. An increase in the rejection of intimate partner violence was evident in 23 of the 26 countries studied and the size of the change was robust in 12 of those countries. For example, in Nigeria, the percent of women who rejected intimate partner violence increased from 33 percent in 2003 to 52 percent in 2008. Nearly a 20-percentage point change within only five years is evidence of a very rapid shift in attitudes. This trend is the same among ever-and never-married women. In countries for which data are available, men's attitudinal trends follow the same patterns.
The increase in rejection of intimate partner violence occurred during the first decade of the 2000s, which corresponds with increasing global attention to issues of violence against women (Merry 2006) . During this time period, world society agents sought to reach individuals directly through activities such as development programming and media outreach. Transnational advocates also pressured national governments for relevant policy action. Such pressure led to a dramatic increase in the number of countries that passed legislation addressing forms of violence against women. At the same time, national political debates likely contributed to the spread of global cultural scripts.
The near uniformity of the observed trend and the speed of change in attitudes about intimate partner violence suggest something occurred in the past decade that affected women (and men) globally. Absent a macro-level influence, there is no reason to expect such extraordinary consistency in attitudinal trends. I posit that diffusion of global cultural scripts about women's rights, gender equality, and the ills of violence against women was an important macro-level factor that influenced national policymakers and people at the grassroots.
Further analysis shows that the demographic processes underlying the attitudinal trends are consistent with the proposed theoretical framework that links world society with nonelite individuals through broad diffusion of global cultural scripts. The changes in attitudes about intimate partner violence occurred too rapidly to be explained by structural socioeconomic or demographic shifts, both of which are expected to occur over the course of generations. Neither shifts in population composition in terms of urban living, educational attainment, and access to media nor cohort replacement explain much of the observed increase in rejection of intimate partner violence.
In the cross-sectional analysis, I found that women with greater access to global cultural scripts through urban living, education, or access to media were more likely to reject intimate partner violence. Between the two survey waves, some countries experienced an increase in these key demographic indicators. These population compositional changes account for some of the increase in the rejection of intimate partner violence, but they explain only a small portion of the total change. In the cross-section, attitudes about intimate partner violence were also associated with women's status within marriage. However, changes in marital gender relations fail to explain the majority of the shift in attitudes about intimate partner violence.
The aggregate-level trend is produced by an increase across socioeconomic groups in the likelihood of rejecting intimate partner violence. This is consistent with the diffusion of global cultural scripts through a wide variety of mechanisms. Cultural scripts are spread not only through narrow channels of cultural diffusion, such as education, but also through mechanisms such as development programming, NGO outreach, and interpersonal networks. That women in a variety of socioeconomic positions have all become more likely to reject intimate partner violence suggests a general cultural shift.
Further evidence of a general cultural shift is provided by the analysis of within-cohort change versus cohort replacement. Results show that within-cohort change explains nearly all of the observed change. Between survey waves, women of all ages became more likely to reject intimate partner violence. This finding, like the finding that population compositional changes do not explain a majority of the attitudinal trend, is also consistent with the wide dissemination and influence of global cultural scripts. The results provide evidence of rapid cultural diffusion, not slow demographic change.
The cohort replacement analysis also led to the surprising finding that younger women were less likely than their elders to reject intimate partner violence. The popular image of social change-inspired by young people coming to adulthood with liberal attitudes-does not apply in this case. In most countries included in this study, the youngest respondents were among the least likely to reject intimate partner violence. Although it may result from the positive relationship between age and women's empowerment (as discussed by Kishor and Subaiya [2008] ), this finding suggests that the relationship between age and intimate partner violence attitudes deserves further research.
This study inspires several other avenues for future research. First, although I examined whether trends in attitudes about intimate partner violence are converging toward global cultural scripts, I did not directly test the influence of global discourse. An important next step is the collection of individual-level data on access to global cultural scripts to directly test the influence of world society.
Second, the focus of this study was on time trends in attitudes about intimate partner violence. Data were comparable across time within country but could not be compared across countries. Further research is needed to investigate cross-national differences in levels of acceptance of intimate partner violence. Analyses examining differences in the speed of change in attitudes about intimate partner violence will also contribute to our understanding of the effects of global cultural diffusion.
Third, future research should expand temporal and geographic coverage. The DHS continues to collect data and recently released a third wave of data on attitudes about intimate partner violence from five countries. The trend of increasing rejection of intimate partner violence accelerated in Ethiopia, Malawi, Nepal, and Zimbabwe. Rwanda saw a slight reversal of the trend. As more data become available, additional analyses should test the longevity of the current trend in attitudes about intimate partner violence. In addition, more data is needed to study the relationship between attitudinal trends in low-, middle-, and high-income countries. Detailed studies of outlier countries should examine why there is increasing acceptance of intimate partner violence in Indonesia, Jordan, and Madagascar. Data used in this study provide few clues as to why attitudinal shifts in those countries did not follow the dominant trend.
Finally, it is important to note that the outcome investigated here was reported attitudes about intimate partner violence. With these data, there is no way to distinguish real attitudinal change from increasing influence of social desirability. For this study, I argue that the distinction is unimportant; respondents' knowledge of the socially desirable response is in itself evidence of the diffusion of global norms. It does matter, however, whether women actually believe it is okay for husbands to beat their wives.
Moreover, studies of the influence of world society on national policies highlight decoupling between form and function resulting from adoption of policy models regardless of how well they fit a nation-state's needs and intentions (Meyer et al. 1997) . The same pattern of decoupling is possible within individuals. Decoupling may manifest as a disconnect between stated attitudes and actions. Individuals will adopt or adapt some aspects of the global cultural discourse and reject others. Similarly, individuals may selectively apply the logic of the global cultural discourse. Still, as Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) found, conformity with world society that begins as an "empty promise" may have long-term consequences by providing language used to promote social change. Additional in-depth research on how individuals make use of global cultural scripts about violence against women will help to advance the findings of this study.
Investigation of connections between global cultural scripts and individual attitudes is an important extension of world society research. Global cultural models matter not only because they influence elites worldwide but also because of their potential to influence millions of individuals in less privileged social locations. During the first decade of the 2000s, as violence against women became an increasingly prominent issue worldwide, women across the globe became more likely to reject intimate partner violence. Results are consistent with the influence of cultural diffusion, not structural socioeconomic or demographic changes. Previous case study research has documented specific instances of the effect of the global on the local. This study found evidence that the diffusion of global cultural scripts can produce widespread trends in attitudes at the individual level.
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across-time wording variation found in Benin, Haiti, and Mali, although these effects are also likely to be small. (Analysis available from the author.) 7. The India surveys excluded the third and fourth standard scenarios and included the following two scenarios instead: if she shows disrespect for inlaws and if he suspects her of being unfaithful. The Jordan surveys excluded the fourth standard scenario and included the following two additional scenarios: if she insults him and if she disobeys him. Nigeria included one extra scenario in both waves: if the food is not cooked on time. The first standard scenario was not asked in Turkey; instead, a scenario asked if she wastes money. Finally, in Cambodia the fifth scenario was excluded and in Zambia the first scenario was excluded, both because of variation in the wording of the scenario across survey waves. 8. To be conservative, only respondents who answered no to each question were assigned a 1 on this dependent variable. Respondents who said "don't know" in reply to any of the scenarios were coded 0. 9. Researchers have also found mixed evidence of an association between spousal age differences and attitudes about intimate partner violence (e.g., Kishor and Subaiya 2008) . In the data used here, there was only a weak association between spousal age gaps and attitudes about intimate partner violence. For the sake of parsimony, I dropped this variable from the analysis. 10. I also conducted this analysis by estimating the marginal effects from a logistic regression and using the marginal effects in place of the coefficients from OLS regression. Results were the same, so I opted to include the OLS regression methodology and results for ease of interpretation. 11. In these five countries, the effect of survey wave (the contribution of within-cohort change) depends on the respondent's birth cohort. Effects of survey year and birth year are not independent so linear regression decomposition cannot isolate their contributions to the change. Nonetheless, the overall picture gleaned from the decomposition is consistent with a closer examination of the data: in Indonesia and Madagascar, cohort replacement made a substantial contribution to the decrease in the percent of women who reject intimate partner violence; in India, Nepal, and Zimbabwe, cohort replacement accounted for none of the increase in the percent of women who reject intimate partner violence.
